The purpose of this article is twofold. First, it examines the requirement in No Child Left Behind (NCLB) that states have all students "proficient" in math and reading by 2013-2014. Second, the article assesses the organizational capacity of eighth-grade programs in Massachusetts to meet that directive. Issues of organizational capacity, system adequacy, and performance accountability frame this discussion. The findings reveal that significant differences persist in the organizational capacity of eighth-grade programs across the state. Moreover, no Massachusetts school has met the NCLB goal of 100% proficiency in either math or reading, calling into question the adequacy of the system or the appropriateness of the policy.
policy in January 2002, only 17 states are on track in achieving that goal (Education Commission of the States, 2003) . Massachusetts is one of those states and thus presents researchers with an opportunity to explore the concepts of organizational capacity, system capacity, and performance-based accountability within the context of NCLB. These concepts are interrelated, where organizational capacity measures the existing ability of an institution to meet the performance standards set. System adequacy measures the aggregate capacity of organizations within that system to meet established standards. Performance-based accountability is an accountability framework where outcomes are the means by which policy makers gauge the compliance of systemic elements with policy. These are important considerations for educational policy makers and administrators as they grapple with appropriate ways to respond to the challenges of NCLB. Developing appropriate responses to this mandate is crucial for state policy makers because although federal contributions to elementary and secondary education average just more than 7% of total operational expenditures, this percentage represents $29.1 billion in compensatory aid (U.S. National Center for Education Statistics, 2003b) . In times of budget shortfalls, states can ill afford to forsake this revenue stream.
The purpose of this article is twofold. First, it examines the requirement in NCLB for states to have all students "proficient" by 2013-2014. This description is placed in a principal-agent or incentives framework and discussed in the context of performance-based accountability systems. Second, the article assesses the organizational capacity of eighth-grade programs in Massachusetts to meet the NCLB directive and the implications of institutional capacity for system adequacy and performance-based accountability. Because statewide examinations given to eighth graders often act as a gatekeeper to secondary education opportunities, this is a useful level at which to explore the implications of this accountability reform.
The remainder of this discussion is organized into four sections. Section 1 describes key components of the proficiency requirement of NCLB and its implications for praxis, especially regarding issues of organizational capacity, system adequacy, and performance-based accountability. Section 2 explores the development of measures for capturing the dual concepts of capacity and adequacy and how they fit into an accountability framework. This section lays the groundwork for the empirical approach used in the study. Section 3 presents the findings from the empirical analysis of eighthgrade programs in Massachusetts. Section 4 concludes with a summary of the findings and its implications for educational administrators and policy makers in the context of NCLB.
NCLB and the Accountability Paradigm Elementary and Secondary Education Act Revisited
NCLB is a "compassionate conservative" update of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965. In its original version, the ESEA addressed the challenges of poverty to the achievement of students by providing more resources to the jurisdictions in which these students were schooled. Capacity was seen in terms of inputs; adequacy was often discussed in terms of equality of funding levels among schools or districts in the system. Accountability in this context was largely fiscal compliance to ensure that educational dollars were being spent in legally approved ways (Alexander, 2004; Odden & Picus, 2000) .
Publication of A Nation at Risk in 1983 (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983) , disagreement among researchers on the impact of money on schools (cf. Hanushek, 1997; Hedges, Laine, & Greenwald, 1994) , relatively low U.S. rankings on international comparisons of student achievement (U.S. National Center for Education Statistics, 2003c) , and a resurgence of market-driven paradigms (Engel, 2000) all fostered an environment that called for greater emphasis on results. In 1994, the ESEA was reauthorized as the Improving America's Schools Act (IASA), and amendments were made that emphasized performance more than previously. Notions of equity were transformed from equal opportunity of resources to equal opportunity of results. As part of that evolution, states were then required to define the "adequate yearly progress" of their schools (IASA, 1994 ). An emphasis on performance-based accountability was coming into full effect.
By 2002, the table was set for an even more outcome-driven fare of policy mechanisms. The authors of the latest reauthorization of the ESEA, labeled No Child Left Behind, implicitly adopted a principal-agent framework where the presumed failures of the system were thought to be because of the motivations of the actors within. That is, NCLB advocates presumed that educators cared more about their own self-interests than they did about the education of children. The assumption that individuals act self-interestedly is a cornerstone of a principal-agent framework and promotes the idea that the key to generating the right policy solution is applying the right incentive. Thus, educational proponents of a principal-agent framework (agency theorists) assert that policy makers need to provide appropriate motivations to educational actors. These may include merit pay for teachers (e.g., Ohio), restructuring for school administrators (e.g., Kentucky), high stakes for students (e.g., New York), and so on. Consequently, accountability systems grounded in a principal-agent framework include a compilation of rewards and sanctions to ensure that policy goals are met and policies effectively implemented. Oftentimes, however, "the complexities of improving schools in the face of performance-based accountability are more apparent to practitioners and researchers than they are to policy makers and reform advocates" (Elmore, 2004, p. 276) .
Agency theorists would counter that it is not organizational complexities that cause schools to fail but an incongruence of interests coupled with asymmetries in information. Because the federal government, citizens, taxpayers, and so on are not able to observe fully the behavior of site administrators, teachers, and students, shirking and opportunism by the latter may occur. Again, there is an assumption that if more appropriate incentives are provided, then the performance of the system would improve. Consistent with that philosophy, proponents of NCLB underscore the need for information, and an NCLB-sponsored Web site states, Information is the key to identifying and solving the challenges in education. Parents and the public have the right to know how their tax dollars are being spent in the education system. . . . Under No Child Left Behind, states will revisit their definition of "adequate yearly progress"-to meet the goals of closing the achievement gap and ensuring every child is learning proficiently by 2012-13. . . . Unlike prior years, states will be required [italics added] to publicize these schools. (U.S. Department of Education, 2003) 
NCLB and an Emphasis on Incentives
To combat the presumed disincentives for high performance, proponents of NCLB stipulate that state educational systems have to build in mechanisms that provide appropriate rewards and sanctions for academic achievement. In their mind, performance-based accountability systems cannot be effective without motivational mechanisms. Thus, if state leaders do not specify the rewards and sanctions attached to institutional underperformance, states are deemed to be off track in meeting the goals of the federal mandate and may be fined. The repertoire of educational carrots and sticks adopted by states is extensive and has targeted various elements in the educational system. For example, states as varied as New York, Maryland, and Mississippi have developed high-stakes exams that require students to pass them to graduate from high school. Michigan initially developed an accreditation system that relied solely on measures of tested achievement; this system has since been modified. Massachusetts formulated a foundation budget and developed policies to hold districts, schools, and students accountable for teaching and learning. This system of rewards and sanctions include technical assistance, removal of a school's principal, and warnings (Fuhrman, Goertz, & Duffy, 2004) .
As indicated by the above discussion, state policy makers have tried a variety of incentive packages, which can be grouped into five main categories: (a) organizational restructuring, (b) contractual agreements, (c) payment incentives, (d) bonding, and (e) monitoring. Each set of strategies reflects the presumption that through the use of incentives by key educational actors (e.g., state and federal policy makers), performance may be improved. Because of the prevalence of incentive theory in the directives of the federal mandate, it is useful to examine key requirements of NCLB from that perspective. That discussion provides a helpful backdrop in assessing the implications of these demands for organizational capacity, system adequacy, and performance accountability in the context of that policy.
Redesigning school structure. The first category of incentive strategies is redesigning the structure of organizations (e.g., schools) to enhance the policy maker's control (e.g., the federal government) over the agent (e.g., state, school district, schools, teachers). This strategy presumes that an outside organization would be better able to overcome educational obstacles than internally controlled administrations. By restructuring organizations and placing externally set examinations, policy makers can define more clearly what an adequate education looks like. An important part of the new requirements of NCLB is its mandate that states are to develop statewide standards in reading, mathematics, and science and to hold all students accountable to those standards. Because the mandate requires all students to be held accountable, it is appropriate to consider organizational capacity in terms of the ability of a school to have all students be proficient.
Massachusetts has responded to that call by enacting state laws and regulations that explicitly establish an accountability system that includes all public schools and districts in that state. Each school is held responsible for student performance on the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS), a statewide assessment program, even if the school acts only as feeder for the grade in which an MCAS test is given (Massachusetts Department of Education, 2003) . Sanctions for underperformance range from a required school or district improvement plan with state oversight to removal of the principal and reassignment of staff to district receivership.
Contractual agreements. The use of explicit or implicit contracts that specify the educator's task is the second agency-theory solution proposed for aligning the interests of policy makers and frontline educators. The requirement of NCLB that there be an imposition of statewide assessment standards is, again, an example. As Elmore, Abelmann, and Fuhrman (1995) point out, "States must decide whom to hold accountable, for what levels of performance, on the basis of what types of performance indicators, with what consequences" (p. 10). A state's decision regarding these four issues will determine the type of standards that are put in place and the effectiveness of its reform strategy. As indicated, Massachusetts has addressed all four questions in its performance-based accountability framework, where (a) schools are held accountable for (b) the proficient performance of all students on (c) designated state exams with (d) the possibility of schools being restructured if performance lags behind targeted levels.
One of the difficulties in implementing this "solution" stems from the multiple roles performed by schools, which are often treated both as pedagogical and social welfare institutions. However, the goals emphasized in NCLB and the consequences therein make it clear that the social welfare prerogative of schools is to be deemphasized. This may have far-reaching implications on the organizational capacity of schools that currently adopt a holistic approach to educating children.
Payment and enforcement incentives. The third agency-theory solution suggested by the literature is the use of payment and enforcement incentives by the policy maker. In the context of NCLB, this seems to be most applicable in terms of funding formulas and the consequences attached to not achieving a set standard. With NCLB, for example, schools face the possibility of declining enrollments and reduced funds if they consistently do not meet required standards. However, these approaches presume that low performance is internally driven, so external motivations can prompt appropriate action. If underperformance is a matter of lack of organizational capacity, rather than lack of individual will, this mechanism may lead to a downward spiral for schools with the highest concentrations of children placed at risk.
In Massachusetts, monetary rewards are given to schools with "exemplary" improvement. These rewards include honoring schools as "compass schools," which entitles these institutions to receive $10,000 "to assist with ongoing improvement initiatives and costs related to participation in effective practice dissemination activities" (Massachusetts Department of Education, 2003) . There are also privately sponsored cash awards for principals of the most improved schools (Massachusetts Department of Education, 2003, p. 13) . In Minnesota, the newly elected governor has proposed having a fund for "super teachers," where individuals are eligible to earn up to $100,000 in salary if they teach at designated schools and raise student achievement dramatically ("Super Teachers," 2003) . To enhance understanding and to facilitate implementation of the federal mandate and state responses therein, more empirical studies should look at the impact of these educational reform measures on students placed at risk.
Bonding. The fourth strategy favored by agency theorists is the "bonding" of educators in either a formal or informal manner. The proliferation of school report cards is an example of this approach. That is, an independent 1 organization evaluates a school (or district) on specified criteria, which allows residents, policy makers, taxpayers, and so on, to see how well their schools are doing. This strategy also would enhance the state and federal government's ability to recognize when reorganization or other sanctions are necessary. For example, the Massachusetts Department of Education assesses schools on their progress based on student performance on the MCAS. District policy makers, in turn, must notify the parents of students who were assigned to schools identified as needing improvement. As part of that process, individual student, school, and district report cards are generated annually by the state (Massachusetts Department of Education, 2003) . This approach presumes that summary statistics not only capture the essence of the school (or district) but can also shame or applaud institutions into doing better.
Monitoring. Another incentive strategy described in the literature is monitoring. Federal and/or state policy makers can observe directly the performance of the educational institutions either during or after task completion. Task in this context refers to the "production" of an educated adult. Monitoring may include site visits during the school year to selected schools and classrooms. States can develop and supervise the administration of specific exams to be given to students at specified periods during the school year. Massachusetts state policy makers, for example, indicate that they will compile a final school and district accountability report based primarily on the results of student performance on statewide achievement tests (per NCLB requirement). This strategy seems to discount the fact that education is only partially an academic enterprise.
Although the above incentive strategies speak to the will of members of an organization to elicit change, they discount the critical role of organizational resources (human and financial) in that process. The knowledge and skills banked by an institution through its structure and staff are not always fungible (Alexander, 1998) . Therefore, a change in policy direction may require an influx of resources in terms of training, monitoring, and so on. How much of an influx depends largely on how big a change the institution is required to make. Thus an understanding of organizational capacity is crucial in assessing the adequacy of the system in which it operates and in gauging the appropriate accountability mechanisms that keep these organizations on task.
The Role of Organizational Capacity
When Hanushek (1997) and others find that money does not matter, there is often an assumption that schools are ineffective because there are inefficiencies in the system. That is, if there were appropriate incentives in each set of schooling relationships, higher attainments could be achieved for the money spent. This opinion suggests that the quality of organizational and faculty resources could be improved without additional costs. This assumption is reflected in many of the requirements in NCLB. Chubb and Moe (1997) also argue that the behavior of stakeholders in the system (parents, teachers, students, administrators, etc.) depends on the incentives facing them. In other words, the authors see multiple, interconnected personal transactions, each with its own set of dynamics and incentives. This is consistent with Betts and Grogger (2003) and Alexander (2003) , who find that higher standards raise overall student performance. Nonetheless, these authors also note that the gains are greatest for the highest achievers. This suggests that the ability of individuals to meet standards is not uniform, which in turn implies that the capacity of the institutions that serve these individuals is also uneven. An incentives approach to policy making may deemphasize the notion of differing capacity and its potential impact on the success of policy implementation.
Unlike money, which is fungible, it is unlikely that there is an existing configuration of resources that allows all schools to meet equally the newly decreed federal standards. Rather, it is likely that those institutions that presently mirror the standards in terms of their performance will be more successful at achieving the NCLB proficiency mandate. This assertion can be applied to all levels of the educational system. That is, a district would be able to meet more easily the standards set if most of its schools have a pattern of student achievement sought by federal and state policy makers.
Similarly, a school can more readily reflect the standards set if most of its classes already have a pattern of student achievement that mimics those sought by federal policy makers and so on. These assumptions are consistent with the U.S. General Accounting Office (2002), which finds that states that were already compliant with the adequate yearly progress requirement of the 1994 IASA are the ones more likely to be on track for the 2002 NCLB Act. Moreover, Coburn (2003) finds that "because teachers draw on their prior knowledge, beliefs and experiences to interpret and enact reforms, they are likely to 'gravitate' towards approaches that are congruent with their prior practice" (p. 4).
The above discussion speaks to the notion of institutional capacity and brings up an important issue on how it should be measured. Linn and others (Linn, 2000; Linn & Kiplinger, 1995) have long discussed what should be the appropriate measure of achievement used in accountability frameworks. The choice of achievement measures will influence one's assessment of the capacity of institutions to meet select performance standards. Many researchers agree that the value added of a program is useful (Reschovsky & Imazeki, 2001 ). However, value-added measures may not meld well with a criterionreferenced, test-based accountability system in which one has to reach an abstract level of proficiency by a certain time. In addition, gain scores may facilitate gaming of the system, where educational administrators can look better across time if they set a low baseline. In Houston, for example, there were large inconsistencies in how district administrators identified dropouts. A recent article in The New York Times reports, Some here [in Houston] are questioning whether the miracle [of higher achievement scores and lower dropout rates] may have been smoke and mirrors, at least on the high school level. And they are suggesting that perhaps Houston is a model of how the focus on school accountability can sometimes go wrong, driving administrators to alter data or push students likely to mar a school's profile-through poor attendance or low test scores-out the back door. [A former employee of the district's office of research and accountability referred to these administrative practices as] "Enron accounting." (Schemo, 2003, p. 10) The Triad of Organizational Capacity, System Adequacy, and Performance-Based Accountability Given the rising importance and increasingly high stakes accorded to quantifying organizational capacity, promoting system adequacy, and ensuring performance-based accountability, it is important to develop fitting operationalizations of what those concepts mean. A good place to start is to recognize their intersections. For instance, a key underpinning in developing accountability frameworks is a working definition of adequacy. That is, when state policy makers prescribe what standards must be reached to be proficient via their accountability mechanisms, they also provide a working definition of how that state describes adequate (e.g., Alexander, 2003; Carnoy, 1983) . In turn, that definition may be used as a benchmark to evaluate the organizational capacity of educational programs to meet the performance standards set. Put another way, organizational capacity measures the existing ability of an institution to meet the performance standards set. System adequacy measures the aggregate capacity of organizations within that system to meet the standards set. Performance-based accountability is an accountability framework where outcomes are the means by which policy makers gauge the compliance of systemic elements with policy.
One benefit of this conceptualization of performance accountability, system adequacy, and organizational capacity is that it ties the evaluation of an educational system to the standards used by its policy makers in their definition of an appropriate education. By doing this, we are recognizing explicitly two points. First, states have the right to determine what an appropriate education is for their students. Second, because of that right, they also have an obligation to ensure that all institutions within their jurisdiction have the appropriate resources (i.e., organizational capacity) to provide it (Alexander, 2003; Carnoy, 1983) .
The ability of schools to meet state and district requirements often depends on their size, composition, and institutional setting. Haller, Monk, Bear, Griffith, and Moss (1990) find that larger schools offer more comprehensive programs than smaller ones, especially in the array of advanced courses provided. If the size of school matters in the way described, students attending smaller schools may be at a disadvantage if access to a comprehensive curriculum is important for student performance. In a later refinement of that analysis, Monk and Haller (1993) find that the effects of school size are uneven across the curriculum. In terms of school composition, Davenport (2003) notes that more diverse schools tend to look worse under NCLB requirements because they have a greater probability of not meeting at least one criterion of the federal mandate. His findings are consistent with those of Kane and Staiger (2002) . Failure to meet one assessment criterion results in an overall label of underperformance. Moreover, institutional settings, such as urbanicity, poverty levels, and ethnic concentrations, matter to student achievement (Alexander, 2003) . Sunderman (2003) also notes that states have varying technical expertise to implement NCLB. Citing the U.S. Government Accounting Office (2002), the author indicates that "the technical demands imposed by NCLB appear to exceed many states' capacity to handle complicated psychometric problems . . . [and] compliance with subgroup accountability is difficult for states to meet" (p. 14). Similarly, schools within the same state also have varying technical expertise, causing their ability to implement NCLB to differ. Moreover, if policy makers consider only a uniform set of national or state standards in determining policies on proficiency, then students who are in schools that have less organizational capacity than average will fare worse than those who are in schools with average or better capacity. Existing evidence suggests that the institutions that will be most disadvantaged by standard definitions of adequacy are the ones that currently serve children who are already placed at risk (Kane & Staiger, 2002) .
Organizational Capacity Measured in Results
Alexander (2003) offers a preliminary measure of the organizational capacity of a school to meet curriculum standards by comparing existing course-taking patterns in mathematics with required course-taking patterns. This article modifies that measure by comparing the current percentage of students performing at proficiency with the desired standard of 100%. If schools have only 60% of its students performing at proficiency, then the school is considered to have only 60% capacity to meet the standards, given existing use of resources. Even if some may argue that the divergence between the desired goal and the actual practice is a matter of inefficiencies in the system, the fact remains that more change will need to occur in those places where the divergence is greatest. Generally speaking, more change will require the infusion of more resources (either in terms of reculturing, retraining, etc.), at least in the short run. This need for investment suggests that policy makers may need to transfer money to material, intellectual, or human resources rather than simply transferring official authority between individuals and agencies (e.g., McDonnell & Elmore, 1987) .
Whereas capacity refers to the individual organizational capability of a school to meet established standards, adequacy refers to the aggregate capacity of schools within that system. That is, the adequacy of a system is based on the proportion of its schools having sufficient capacity to meet the standards set. In the context of NCLB, this is measured as the percentage of schools that have 100% of their students performing at proficient levels in designated subjects. Using this operationalization of system adequacy does not provide a universal measure on all assessment dimensions. For instance, we may find that a state's educational system is adequate for eighth-grade math but inadequate for eighth-grade English or adequate for fourth-but not for eighth-grade math.
These operationalizations of organizational capacity and system adequacy are meant to be descriptive, not prescriptive. They offer a means of making performance-based accountability mechanisms more meaningful and their implications for schools and students more obvious. Although more nuanced measures of adequacy are available (e.g., Odden & Picus, 2000) , they do not capture the blunt simplicity of having a 100% target level. The working definitions provided in this article serve as a means of conducting a readily available needs assessment of schools and educational systems by paying explicit attention to existing achievement patterns. Like the "quick and dirty" policy analysis methods described in Patton and Sawicki (1993) , the measures described herein offer policy makers a set of quick but systematic procedures to identify structural challenges within the system. Identifying structural challenges within a system is important for designing accountability mechanisms because it can help to highlight those factors that are within the control of school leaders and those that are outside their purview.
One of the expressed purposes of the NCLB Act is to eliminate achievement gaps between different student groups, at least at a state-defined level of proficiency. The requirement of NCLB that subgroups be measured separately suggests that not only are absolute mean levels of student achievement important, but the distribution of these levels are, as well. Consequently, this article also examines the presence of horizontal equity in the system along with its assessment of organizational capacity and system adequacy.
Data Source
The empirical analysis in this study relies on public eighth-grade programs in Massachusetts to inform further the discourse on the role of organizational capacity, system adequacy, and accountability frameworks in the context of NCLB. It relies on school-level data provided in the Common Core of Data database of the National Center for Educational Statistics (2003a), the Web site of the Massachusetts Department of Education (www. doe.mass.edu), the Massachusetts charter school initiative (Massachusetts Department of Education, 2001) , and the Education Trust Web site (www2. edtrust.org/edtrust/dtm/). Only public schools that contained eighth grade were included. The merged file contains school-level information on ethnicity, size, urbanicity, and poverty of the student population as well as the percentage of students passing the Massachusetts comprehensive assessments in reading and math in 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001 . The demographic data are for the year 2000. Preliminary analysis suggests that these demographic data have not changed greatly in the 4 years analyzed for the achievement variables.
Although these data predate the enactment of NCLB, they are after the 1994 reauthorization of the ESEA, which required documenting adequate yearly progress of schools. Documenting the progress of Massachusetts in the wake of that requirement provides context for the potential challenges present in the system for meeting the proficiency standard of NCLB. Note that because this discussion looks at the organizational capacity of schools, not students, this analysis uses unweighted statistics.
Organizational Capacity of Massachusetts Public Schools
The data in Table 1 provide descriptive statistics of key demographic and institutional data for all public schools in Massachusetts in 2000 as well as by rural and inner city status. Public schools in Massachusetts generally met the 95% standard imposed by the authors of NCLB, where at least 95% of the test-taking pool participated in the exam. Information on specific subgroup participation was not used in this analysis and is not required of schools if subgroups by ethnicity (American Indian, Asian, Black, Latino, and White), poverty status, language proficiency, and special education were below a critical mass. For Massachusetts, this critical mass or minimum sample size is an average of 20 students/year for each 2 year rating period, and no fewer than 15 students in any one year. . . . [For] improvement ratings, [Massachusetts uses] a standard error band of 2.5 points, for all schools and districts that have an average of 50 students/year and no fewer than 40 students in one year. For schools with an average of 20 or more but fewer than 50 students/year, . . . [Massachusetts uses] a custom determined error-band of up to 4.5 points to determine improvement ratings and only issue ratings when a 95% confidence level can be achieved. (Massachusetts Department of Education, 2003, p. 31) For reasons of confidentiality, individual student information is not reported for groups of fewer than 10 people. Given their less diverse nature, rural schools would have fewer student categories than urban institutions on which they would have to report data separately. This is a disadvantage for urban programs for at least two reasons. First, there is extra administrative and logistical oversight needed to provide additional data. Second, the more categories for which a school is responsible, the more opportunities there are for that program to miss the standard set and thus be labeled underperforming (Kane & Staiger, 2002) . Table 2 presents information on school organizational capacity and system adequacy for all Massachusetts public schools using the operationalizations described above. Because NCLB requires all students to be proficient in a statewide exam, we measure school capacity as the percentage of students deemed proficient in the designated subject. Thus, we calculated school capacity as the percentage of students who reached proficiency in the eighthgrade statewide exam in reading and mathematics. Participation rates in the respective tests are also included. These high levels of participation imply that organizations are not gaming the system by restricting the participation of students not likely to do well.
Each data cell contains four figures: (a) the average percentage of students who performed at proficiency, (b) the standard deviation of the distribution, (c) the number of schools included in the analysis, and (d) the coefficient of variation for the analysis. The coefficient of variation is derived from dividing the standard deviation by the mean of the distribution; it captures how much the population is clustered around the mean. More horizontal equity is achieved the lower the ratio.
The number in column 2 of the second row of Table 2 indicates that on average, schools had 54.49% of its students reaching proficient levels in reading in 1998; by 2001, this average had risen to 65.34%, a 20% increase. The average difference between schools continued to be relatively stable, with standard deviations equaling 21.7 in 1998 and 22.1 in 2001. The number of schools increased from 352 in 1998 to 403 in 2001, probably reflecting the growth of charter schools during that time. The coefficient of variation for average proficiency in reading fell from 39.74% in 1998 to 33.84% in 2001. This indicates that in 1998, two thirds of the schools were within 39.7% of the mean school capacity; in 2001, this band had narrowed so that two thirds of the schools were within 33.8% of the average capacity. Thus, not only did average organizational capacity increase for eighth-grade reading, but the horizontal equity of the system improved. Nonetheless, generally accepted notions of equity (e.g., Odden & Picus, 2000) suggest that the differences between schools in average reading achievement for eighth graders are still too high. Looking at similar data for mathematics, we find that average school capacity was lower and gains were less marked for the 4 years studied. Schools generally operated at 31.8% capacity in mathematics in 1998; this number had increased slightly (but significantly) to 33.6% in 2001. Average differences between schools grew slightly, with standard deviation rising from 19.9 in 1998 to 20.7 in 2001. The coefficient of variation shows great discrepancy in the average student proficiency in schools in eighth-grade mathematics. In 1998, two thirds of the schools were within 62.8% of the mean proficiency levels of achievement; in 2001, this variation was still high, and two thirds of the schools were within 61.6% of the average levels of proficiency. The broad band of variation indicates a fairly low level of horizontal equity within the system. Although these results seem promising for reading overall, it is also important to note that there was no school that had all 100% of its students at proficient levels in either reading or math, the standard required by NCLB. Consequently, using the measure adopted in this study, the educational system has 0% adequacy in both subjects at the eighth-grade level. These findings suggests that state policy makers in Massachusetts have a systemwide problem in meeting the standards laid out by the authors of NCLB in the time designated.
The last two columns of Table 2 indicate how far existing performance is away from the target of 100% student proficiency in 100% of the schools. 2 The data show that there are more challenges to the system for mathematics, which is 66.37 percentage points away from the goal versus 34.67 percentage points for reading. The percentage of students rated as proficient would have to increase by about 3 percentage points every year for reading and 7 points for math. This suggests that the rate of growth in institutional performance in mathematics would have to be much greater than it has been during the past 4 years; institutional progress in reading seems to be on the right track.
As daunting as the above numbers are for Massachusetts as a whole, the above averages mask large differences across the state. The plight of students attending public schools in the inner city and in rural areas is well documented (e.g., Kozol, 1992; Thorson & Edmonson, 2000) . To examine the associations between school organizational capacity, system adequacy, and institutional setting, the above statewide analysis was repeated for (a) Massachusetts eighth-grade programs exclusive of inner city and rural public schools, (b) inner city eighth-grade programs, and (c) rural eighthgrade programs. The results of those analyses are presented in Tables 3, 4 , and 5, respectively. Nonrural, non-inner city programs. Using a similar framework as above, each data cell in Tables 3, 4 , and 5 contains four figures: (a) the average percentage of students who performed at proficiency, (b) the standard deviation of the distribution, (c) the number of schools included in the analysis, and (d) the coefficient of variation for the analysis. For example, the number in column 2 of the second row of Table 3 indicates that on average, schools in Massachusetts, excluding rural and inner city eighth-grade programs, had a 63.9% capacity to meet the standards in reading in 1998. By 2001, this average had risen significantly (p < .05) to 73.96%, a 15.7% increase during the 4 years. The average variation between schools (as captured by measures of standard deviation) also fell, from 16.75 in 1998 to 15.82 in 2001. There was also a concurrent fall in the coefficient of variation from 26.2 in 1998 to 21.39 in 2001. The lower level of the coefficient of variation across time suggests a greater clustering of schools around the mean proficiency level, thus displaying a greater degree of horizontal equity. Overall, these numbers are more promising for these nonrural, non-inner city schools than they are for the state as a whole.
As with the statewide analysis, the average organizational capacity of schools to meet the mathematics requirements was substantially less than their ability to meet reading standards. Massachusetts public school programs in 1998, on average, had a 39.73% capacity to meet the math target of 100% of their students being proficient in that subject. This percentage rose slightly (but significantly) to 41.36% in 2001. The distribution of performance remained highly uneven across programs, however. The standard variation between schools went up from 18.42 in 1998 to 19.16 in 2001 , and the coefficient of variation rose to as high as 50.83 in 1999, settling at 46.3 in 2001 . These numbers suggest that there was little horizontal equity among schools in their ability to meet the standards laid out in NCLB.
Using the requirements of NCLB as a benchmark, system adequacy was not achieved for either reading or math and seemed a far-off target for the latter subject. Even though nonrural, non-inner city school programs showed higher rates of proficiency in both subjects than the state as a whole, system adequacy still proved to be illusive in the short term. There was no school that had 100% of its students proficient in either reading or mathematics. However, if schools continued to increase the percentage of students proficient in reading at the same pace as the previous 4 years, then eighth-grade programs in this subject seem to be on track. Mathematics programs still seem unlikely to meet the requirements of the act if they continue to improve at their current pace. Table 4 show that the overall capacity of eighth-grade inner city programs to meet the standards in reading and math lagged significantly behind the rest of the state. The average capacity of these school programs to meet reading requirements ranged from 32.17 in 1998 to 43.92 in 2001. Although this capacity increased significantly during the 4 years, on average, fewer than 50% of students are performing at proficient levels in reading. The average variation between inner city schools vis-à-vis performance at proficient levels has increased in the past 4 years, where standard deviation increased from 18.36 in 1998 to 22.03 in 2001. Notwithstanding, the bulk of inner city schools seems to be clustering more closely around the mean, as illustrated by the coefficient of variation declining somewhat, from 57.06 in 1998 to 50.17 in 2001. That said, horizontal equity remains quite low. Nonetheless, if reading programs are able to maintain their pace of increased student proficiency of the past 2 years, then they may still be on track for the 2013 deadline.
Inner city programs. The data in
The numbers for math capacity in inner city school programs are even more troubling than those for reading. The capacity of eighth-grade inner city programs to meet math standards ranged from 14.47 in 1998 to 16.74 in 2001. Not only are these figures depressingly low, there remain large gaps in average performance among inner city schools. The coefficient of variation stood at 98.38 in 2001. This means that two thirds of these schools are within 98.4% of the mean proficiency levels in math. In other words, for us to gauge the average levels of proficiency for two thirds of the school, we would have to have a range of performance levels that essentially doubled the mean on the high end and halved it on the low end. These equity measures highlight the "savage inequalities" described in Kozol (1992) .
For system adequacy to be achieved, organizational capacity would have to be increased, and eighth-grade programs in math would have to quadruple the rate of institutional growth for them to be on track for the 2013-2014 NCLB deadline. Moreover, because of the diversity of inner city eighthgrade programs, they typically have to report on the performance of all subgroups (except, perhaps, for American Indians). As indicated, the greater the number of categories on which school administrators have to provide formal data, the greater the chance of being labeled underperforming.
Rural programs. The overall capacity of rural eighth-grade programs to meet federal requirements for reading and mathematics mirrors that of programs outside of inner cities. Indeed, rural reading capacity often exceeded those of the other institutional categories. For reading, average organizational capacity ranged from 63.17% of students being proficient in 1998 to 75.88% in 2001. Furthermore, the inequities in the rural system continue to improve across time and were less pronounced than for programs in other institutional settings. The coefficient of variation fell from a high of 17.83 in 1999 to 14.05 in 2001. As with other institutional settings, rural eighth-grade programs appear to be on track for reading as long as they maintain the same pace of institutional progress that they have had for the past 4 years.
By contrast, math achievement continues to be problematic. That is, organizational capacity increased slightly in the past 4 years, from an average of 36.77% of students being proficient in math in 1998 to 39.57% in 2001. The increases in the latter 2 years are not significant. Not only was the overall level of rural performance in math relatively low, but there were also large differences between programs, and the coefficient of variation hovered around 50% for all 4 years. For these rural programs to meet the NCLB goal in math, they have to quadruple the rate of growth in their performance.
The above analysis reveals that it is not individual schools alone that seem unable to meet the challenges of NCLB but the state educational system as a whole. It also highlights the large contextual differences that exist between the capacities of eighth-grade programs across the state to meet the specified standards. These differences are especially pronounced in the current levels and allocation of resources for math and in inner city eighth-grade programs. These findings demonstrate that simply defining proficiency does not necessarily lead to higher performance by all.
Implications for Policy Makers and Administrators
Researchers often couch equal education opportunity in terms of equal access to an adequate education (Augenblick, Myers, & Anderson, 1997; Guthrie, 2001; Odden, 2000) . Policy makers and researchers alike have largely moved away from input definitions of equality to definitions focused on results. Performance-based accountability mechanisms are part of that evolution. The NCLB Act specifically calls states to rate their schools based on overall student performance and student achievement within subgroups categorized by ethnicity, poverty, language proficiency, and special education groupings. Its expressed purpose is to ensure that all students are proficient in the designated subject by a specified date. This analysis examined the implications of these federal standards for Massachusetts, a state deemed to be on track by federal policy makers. Notwithstanding, no Massachusetts eighth-grade program has 100% of its students proficient in either math or reading. This finding calls into question the adequacy of the system or the appropriateness of the policy.
Although the adequacy measure used in this study is a blunt instrument, it highlights clearly some of the difficulties of using a standard of perfection as a practical target. Rothman (2004) and others suggest that it is problematic to employ exam results as synonymous with learning. The challenges of doing so become even more pronounced when perfection in the system is the goal sought. Research suggests that having a seemingly unachievable performance target may lead to gaming (Kim, 2003) .
When gaming takes place at the district or school level, there may be different ways for state policy makers to counter that tactic. For example, the California Department of Education flags baseline data that seem inappropriately low and deletes them from the data pool. Another strategy is to use status achievement measures to avoid the potential incentives for local administrators to lowball the base. However, using abstract status achievement (i.e., levels of achievement rather than growth) may prompt other gaming strategies, including fudging figures, counseling students out of school, mislabeling children as special education, and so on. In addition, status measures may continue to ignore the importance of institutional context in developing an appropriate accountability system framed around performance standards.
Compliance by gaming is not unique to local administrators. Kim (2003) indicates that state officials also have strong incentives to lower proficiency standards and/or to create dual accountability systems, one for within and one for "show" to the federal government. He cites the examples of Colorado, which will count students reaching the partially proficient standards on the Colorado statewide tests as meeting the federal definition of proficient, and Connecticut, which established a new proficiency level to comply with NCLB, a level that is lower than the state's own definition of proficiency.
The unintended consequences of well-meaning policies often fall most heavily on those individuals and institutions placed most at risk. Given that organizational capacity is uneven across the state, especially among inner city programs, Massachusetts policy makers must pay close attention to the impact of accountability policies on less privileged populations. In general, educational programs that already have performance patterns that reflect state and federal requirements are better positioned to implement the reform. Yet even those well-positioned programs seem unlikely to achieve 100% proficiency in the designated subjects. Programs at the bottom half of the distribution face even more institutional constraints, for they are being asked to allocate schooling resources in a way different from the past. In the context of NCLB, those institutions that are least able to meet the standards, given existing achievement patterns, are also the ones on which the directive places the most additional costs. That is, because inner city programs tend to be more diverse than those of the rest of the state, they usually have to report on the performance of more subcategories of students. As noted elsewhere, the more categories on which schools have to report, the more likelihood there is for federal and state policy makers to label these institutions as underperforming.
Given the patterns of achievement that exist among educational programs, it is important to devise policies that recognize that institutions are not starting on a level playing field. Higher levels of poverty and diversity accompanied by lower levels of achievement often prevail in inner city schools. Proponents of NCLB are not wrong in recommending the use of supplemental services for those students in need of help. The literature indicates that students in lower performing programs may benefit from supplemental services to be on par with peers already ready for more advanced work (Alexander, 2003) . However, this may entail longer school days and/or a longer year for students in underperforming institutions. This seems to suggest that incorporating different time lags for students in these contexts would be beneficial but is inconsistent with the single deadline of 2013-2014 for all students.
Another concern is the question of who will pay for these approved educational extras. Under NCLB, these costs are slated to be covered by the schools and/or districts themselves. One Republican congressional aide quoted in Sunderman (2003) states, It's not just a matter of how many resources you have. It's a matter of how you spend your resources. And if you are a failing school or a failing school district, you don't necessarily need a huge infusion of funds. . . . It's also a matter of deciding how to better use those funds-be it on the curriculum, be it on better teachers, or you know, preparing your paraprofessionals. Be it maybe not focusing on a music program and instead using your music dollars for a reading program. (Congressional aide, as cited in Sunderman, 2002, p. 17) Although it is true that allocating resources exactly as we do now may lead to exactly the same results (Hanushek, 1997) , it is also true that investment is an important part in growing an organization. As noted by Reschovsky and Imazeki (2001) , These schools [with above-average costs] will fail, not necessarily because of their own inability to effectively educate children, but because they were provided with insufficient fiscal resources to do the job. (p. 375) There is a clear need for improvement in many public schools, especially inner city institutions (Anyon, 1997; Kozol, 1992) . The task of improving them presents a complex challenge. The analysis of Massachusetts public eighth-grade programs suggests that merely changing direction and consequences by themselves will not be enough to foster sufficient change so that all students are at proficient levels in reading and mathematics. Policy makers at all levels of the educational system need to assess the existing capacity of institutions to meet targeted goals. Presently, federal requirements mandate that state policy makers create proficiency targets and that they document which schools reach it, but NCLB does not pay "corresponding attention to the mechanisms by which these strategies will influence teaching and learning" (Sunderman, 2003, p. 2) . Fowler (2004) That is true in this case, as well. Budget deficits at both the state and federal levels make it less likely that either jurisdiction is willing to invest additional monies for the provision of better facilities, more experienced and qualified teachers, and expansion of programs like Project Read for at-risk youth.
The goal of NCLB is to ensure that all students have equal access to high quality institutions, but we need more than regulatory policy to facilitate that change. The lack of an adequate educational system in an on-track state supports that assertion. There needs to be greater emphasis on the contextual differences that exist between schools and between students. Part of that process entails a strategy that explicitly incorporates these differences in the development of an accountability system that redefines learning and how learning is counted (Schmoker, 1999) . The goal of NCLB is too important to warrant anything less.
